I. INTRODUCTION
As a teacher of both the required, first-year course in federal constitutional law and an upper-level course on state constitutional law, I want to focus on the relationship between the Federal Constitution and the state constitutions in this Article for the 2010 Kansas Law Review Symposium. I will use the particular example of the right to keep and bear arms, recognized in the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and in provisions in forty-four state constitutions, to highlight a few points about the relationship between these two constitutional regimes. My overall goal is to address briefly some of the common misconceptions I have encountered regarding the relationship between, and the roles of, the federal and state constitutions.
I identify and briefly explain three fundamental propositions about the relationship between the federal and state constitutions, using a few examples relevant to my home state of Kansas to illustrate the general propositions. The Article ultimately applies those general principles to the particular context of the individual right to possess and use firearms. I speculate about how gun rights may develop in the future under state constitutions now that the Supreme Court of the United States and the Second Amendment are an active part of this area of the law. My conclusion is that state supreme courts and state constitutions may play a prominent role in the development of gun rights, though state-based rights may be significantly limited by acts of Congress that regulate firearms and preempt any contrary state law, including state constitutions. In this instance, at least, the entity that will most influence the scope of state constitutional rights is likely to be Congress, not the Supreme Court of the United States. 
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THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 869 mandate" for citizens not otherwise covered by health insurance to purchase such coverage or else pay a penalty or tax. 5 The 2010 Kansas proposal would have added a new article 16 to the Kansas Constitution, providing in pertinent part as follows:
Article 16.-HEALTH CARE §1. Health care. (a) To preserve the freedom of Kansans to provide for their health care:
(1) A law or rule shall not compel, directly or indirectly, any person, employer or health care provider to participate in any health care system or purchase health insurance.
(2) A person or employer may pay directly for lawful health care services and shall not be required to pay penalties or fines for paying directly for lawful health care services. A health care provider may accept direct payment for lawful health care services and shall not be required to pay penalties or fines for accepting direct payment from a person or employer for lawful health care services.
(b) Subject to reasonable and necessary rules that do not substantially limit a person's options, the purchase or sale of health insurance in private health care systems shall not be prohibited by law or rule. 6 The Kansas proposal also included an "explanatory statement" that was to be included with the measure on the ballot. That "explanation" included the following statement: "A vote for this proposition would preserve constitutionally the right of a person, employer or health care provider to be free from laws or rules compelling participation in any health care system . . . ." 7 In 2011, essentially the same proposal has been reintroduced in the Kansas legislature. An important question is whether such an amendment to the Kansas Constitution will have any legal effect. Despite the assertion in the "explanatory statement" about preserving "constitutionally the right" not to be compelled to participate in a health care system, 9 the proposed Kansas constitutional amendment cannot override lawfully exercised federal power. 10 Indeed, it is clear that, if adopted, such an amendment can have no effect on the constitutionality or application of the federal health care law to Kansas and to Kansans. If Congress has the power to enact the individual health insurance mandate, 11 then no state constitutional amendment, or state statute, can preclude the operation of such a federal law on a state's citizens.
Thus, although the constitutional amendment may have value as an expression of Kansans' unhappiness and disagreement with federal law, 12 it can have no legal effect in the federal arena if Congress had the power to enact the federal law. Such an amendment would, however, be binding with respect to state law, meaning that it certainly can preclude the Kansas legislature from compelling Kansans to participate in health insurance or health care programs. That result may be sufficient from the proponents' perspective, coupled with the amendment's role as a symbolic statement about the opinion of a majority of Kansans on the federal health care law.
On the other hand, because the amendment would be binding on the Kansas legislature, that body should at least be cognizant of the fact that if the amendment were adopted and the legislature later determined that it might be good policy to require certain individuals to purchase some form of health insurance, the amendment would preclude the state legislature from acting, absent another state constitutional amendment to repeal the effect of the first one. Maybe the Kansas legislature will never block.html (reporting that Kansas House Representative Brenda Landwehr has "said she'll push a 'Health Care Freedom Amendment' even though a majority of states, including Kansas, are pursuing legal challenges to the new federal law. She said she'll introduce a new version of the measure by early February. She expects it to mirror proposals with the same name from last year, which would prohibit the state from requiring individuals or businesses to buy health insurance."). 
B. Proposition #2: State Constitutions May Provide Greater Protection of Individual Rights than Does the U.S. Constitution
It is a relatively straightforward-and indisputable-proposition that state constitutions may accord greater protections of individual rights than the U.S. Constitution has been interpreted to provide.
17
This principle is based on several factors, including (1) that the Federal Constitution always has been viewed as a "floor" of rights, not a "ceiling"; (2) that state constitutions may include express rights that are not included at all, or at least not in the same fashion, in the U.S. Constitution; and (3) that the fundamental nature of our federal system allows for variations among the states in this respect.
18 Thus, if the U.S. Constitution does not protect particular speech or religious practices, prevent the government from taking private property for certain purposes, prevent particular police conduct, guarantee education rights to children, provide for same-sex marriage, or guarantee a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy, nothing in American law or tradition precludes the states from recognizing any and all of these rights under their state constitutions.
The examples of this proposition are numerous, so I will highlight only two from Kansas by way of illustration. The first example involves education. The Supreme Court of the United States held almost four decades ago that there is no federal constitutional "right to education" because there is no express provision in the U.S. Constitution granting such a right and education is not a "fundamental right."
19 The Court has shown no inclination to revisit or revise that holding, but the state courts have been far from inactive in the area of education. Instead, the financing of public education has been perhaps one of the most active areas of state constitutional law over the past few decades.
That certainly was true of Kansas during the past ten years. In state court litigation challenging the Kansas funding system for K-12 schools, the Kansas Supreme Court expressly addressed educational rights under the Kansas Constitution. In sharp contrast to the U.S. Constitution, the Kansas Constitution has an article-article VI-explicitly devoted to education. Section 1 of that article provides that the "legislature shall provide for intellectual, educational, vocational and scientific improvement by establishing and maintaining public schools." 20 Section 6(b) further provides that the "legislature shall make suitable provision for finance of the educational interests of the state." 1963, 1973-74 (2008) .
26. Montoy II, 120 P.3d at 311 (Beier, J., concurring) ("I disagree with the holding . . . that education is not a fundamental right under the Kansas Constitution. I believe it is."); id. at 318 (Luckert, J., concurring) ("I would find that education is a fundamental right under the Kansas Constitution."); Montoy IV, 138 P.3d at 766 (Rosen, J., concurring) ("Every child in Kansas has a fundamental right to an education guaranteed by the Kansas Constitution.").
27. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 28. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
29. "The right of trial by jury shall be inviolate." KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 5. "In all prosecutions, the accused shall be allowed . . . a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed. " Id. § 10. 30. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971 only U.S. Supreme Court precedent on point holds to the contrary. 33 But even assuming for the sake of argument both that the Kansas Supreme Court is wrong on that point and that the U.S. Supreme Court precedent rejecting such a right remains valid federal precedent, L.M. is an interesting example of the proposition I am discussing in this section. Indeed, even were it absolutely clear that there is no federal right to a jury trial in juvenile cases, nothing in the U.S. Constitution precludes Kansas from recognizing such a right under the Kansas Constitution, as the court did in L.M.
There may in fact be much stronger or more defensible reasons to recognize such a right under state law rather than federal law. For example, one of the Kansas constitutional jury-trial provisions-on which the concurrence in L.M. relied but on which the majority curiously did not 34 -speaks in emphatic terms not directly mirrored in the Federal Constitution: "The right of trial by jury shall be inviolate." 35 Furthermore, under the Kansas Constitution, the Kansas Supreme Court can take account of factors unique to Kansas, such as (1) state constitutional language that differs significantly from federal constitutional provisions; 36 (2) the history and evolution of the Kansas juvenile justice system, which arguably has come more and more to resemble the adult criminal justice system-including lessening the emphasis on juvenile rehabilitation and increasing the emphasis on retribution and punishment; 37 and (3) the practical impact such a ruling will have on the juvenile justice system in Kansas, including the effect on prosecutors, the defense bar, and the trial courts. 38 33. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Although acknowledging that the U.S. Supreme Court has never revisited or revised its decision in McKeiver, and that no state supreme court has ever held that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury trial in juvenile cases-a proposition that the L.M. majority oddly characterized as "not find [ing] total support from the courts in some of our sister states"-the L.M. majority nonetheless remained "undaunted in [its] belief that juveniles are entitled to the right to a jury trial guaranteed to all citizens under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution." In re L.M., 186 P.3d at 171 (emphasis added).
34. See In re L.M., 186 P.3d at 172-73 (Luckert, J., concurring) ("I concur in the majority's conclusion that L.M. has a constitutional right to trial by jury, but I base this conclusion on the rights guaranteed by § 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights rather than the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, which are relied upon by the majority.").
35. KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 5. 36. See HOLLAND ET AL., supra note 2, at 153 ("When the language of the state constitutional guarantee differs materially from its federal counterpart, the state courts have an additional reason for construing their constitutions differently.").
37. See generally In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164 (noting that the juvenile justice system is now patterned after the adult criminal system).
38. See HOLLAND ET AL., supra note 2, at 139 (noting that state courts can "allow local
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Moreover, a rule under the Kansas Constitution affects only Kansas, leaving other states free to interpret their jury-trial rights as they deem appropriate under state law and local conditions. A Sixth Amendment ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court, in marked contrast, would establish a baseline requirement for all states, which may be one reason why, at least in some instances, the U.S. Supreme Court may be reluctant to announce or recognize new federal constitutional rights or to interpret federal individual-rights provisions aggressively in favor of greater rights. Lastly, by also relying on the state constitution as an independent basis for recognizing a jury-trial right in L.M., the Kansas Supreme Court precluded Kansas from appealing that court's debatable holding under federal law to the U.S. Supreme Court.
39 I am not suggesting that the Kansas Supreme Court had any tactical strategy in this regard but, rather, want to highlight an important point about the relationship between the federal and state constitutions: not only may state supreme courts interpret state constitutions more expansively than the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal Constitution, but such decisions are immune from U.S. Supreme Court review, so long as they are based clearly and independently on state law.
40
Of course, state supreme courts often follow federal law when interpreting analogous provisions of state constitutions. The Kansas Supreme Court has described its interpretation of the Kansas Constitution in this regard as follows:
While we can recognize a broader right under the Kansas Constitution, we have not explicitly done so in our [ A perhaps trickier conceptual proposition, but one that is equally as strong and accurate as the first two propositions identified above, is the notion that state constitutions also can provide less protection of a particular right than the Federal Constitution provides. This is in a sense a theoretical proposition because a state constitutional interpretation giving lesser rights than the U.S. Constitution cannot have legal effect so long as the federal constitutional "floor" remains in effect. 43 But this point highlights that on some very important and potentially controversial issues, the state constitutions may enshrine different value judgments than those found in the U.S. Constitution, and not always in favor of recognizing greater rights.
Two controversial examples will illustrate this point. First, many states, including Kansas, define "marriage" as "constituted by one man and one woman only." In August 2010, a federal district court held that prohibiting samesex marriages violates the U.S. Constitution.
47
That case is now on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 48 and undoubtedly will be pursued to the Supreme Court, no matter how the Ninth Circuit rules. It is entirely possible that the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately will review this case or another case raising the same issues. If the Supreme Court were to rule that the Federal Constitution recognizes and protects an individual right to marry a person of the same sex, then no state-including Kansas-could give legal effect to state constitutional prohibitions on same-sex marriage. 49 The result would be a situation in which some states clearly desire to provide less constitutional protection of individual rights, but the federal constitutional "floor" precludes them from giving effect to their constitutional orientation or preferences.
A second example arises in the context of abortion and a woman's right to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy. Some states certainly would prefer that abortion be illegal in all or virtually all circumstances, and they may ultimately express that view in their state laws or constitutions.
50 But those preferences can be given no more legal effect than the Supreme Court's federal constitutional abortion jurisprudence 46. Id. art. 15, § 16(b 51 and declare that the U.S. Constitution neither creates nor protects a woman's individual right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy could these states ever give legal effect to their expressed preferences. Of course, deciding which side in the abortion debate provides for greater or lesser protection of individual rights depends, I suppose, on one's perspective. For the pro-choice side, federal law currently provides greater protection of women's rights than some states might recognize if they were free to determine the scope of such rights. For the pro-life side, federal law provides less protection for the rights of the unborn, and so I assume their view would be that state law could in fact provide greater protection of individual rights, if unconstrained by the federal constitutional doctrine recognized in Roe and subsequent cases.
In any event, these two examples are intended to illustrate that there may well be circumstances in which at least some states desire to provide less protection of certain individual rights than the Federal Constitution has been held to require. Thus, it is perhaps inaccurate to think of state constitutional law as necessarily a one-way ratchet, always moving in favor of the states recognizing greater individual rights than the Supreme Court has interpreted the U.S. Constitution to provide. The states certainly may, in given instances, prefer a very different recognition of rights than provided by the Federal Constitution, and those state preferences may go in either direction-in favor of greater protection or in favor of lesser protection.
III. APPLYING THE FUNDAMENTAL PROPOSITIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO POSSESS AND USE FIREARMS

A. Individuals Have a Limited Right to Keep and Bear Arms Under the Second Amendment, and This Right Applies Against State and Local Governments
For a remarkable 220 years, the Supreme Court never decided the question whether the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution recognizes an individual right to own, possess, and use firearms. The Second Amendment's elliptical language is well-known and has been 51. 410 U. S. 113 (1973 The Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment (1) creates an individual right to keep and bear arms that is not limited by reference to the militia purpose expressly recognized in the amendment and (2) the D.C. total ban on common handguns and restrictions on the readiness of long guns in the home were unconstitutional. 55 Importantly, for state constitutional law purposes, the Court issued the following explicit caveat: "Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited."
56
The Court pointedly-and without any further explanation-cautioned that,
[a]lthough we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.
57
The Court did not specify-indeed it expressly declined to specify or articulate-a particular test or level of scrutiny for Second Amendment challenges.
58
Because Heller involved a federal enclave and thus a "federal" law, not a state or local government enactment, it did not resolve the question Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 191, 206-07 (2006). 63. See, e.g., Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320, 322-23 (N.C. 2009 ) (holding that a state constitutional provision virtually identical to the Second Amendment precluded the state from denying the right to keep and bear arms to a nonviolent felon who had lived peacefully and committed no further violations of the law for seventeen years since his felony conviction).
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As the table illustrates, a few state constitutions have language that tracks the Second Amendment, 64 though it is worth remembering that several state constitutional firearms-rights provisions predate the Second Amendment, 65 and thus it is perhaps the Second Amendment that mimics the language of state constitutions, not vice versa. 66 In total, forty-four state constitutions currently contain a gun-rights provision.
67 At least thirty state constitutions explicitly refer to a right to keep and bear arms in self-defense, variously phrased as defense of "self," "home," "themselves," or in other ways. 68 A few state constitutions refer to the right as relating to the "common defense," 69 and a handful recognize the right without specifying any purpose-militia, self-defense, common defense, or otherwise.
70
Indeed, some states, such as Kansas, appear to have adopted wording to make clear that their state constitutional provision recognizes rights separate and apart from any militia purpose or notions, thus granting rights much broader than the "collective right" view of the Second Amendment, and perhaps even potentially broader than the Second Amendment as interpreted in Heller. 65. This is a point that the majority in Heller made in interpreting the Second Amendment to recognize an individual right, rather than solely a collective, militia-related right. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 600-02 (2008) .
66. That obviously is not the case with respect to Alaska and Hawaii, but it could well be true of the Carolina constitutions and the Virginia Constitution, as well as other founding-era state constitutions that subsequently have been amended to alter the language by which they recognize gun rights. As the ballot measure explained-or repeated, "[t]he purpose of this amendment is to preserve constitutionally the right of a person to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home and state, and for all other lawful purposes, including hunting and recreation."
74
Proponents of the measure stated, for example, that "'[i]t's just making certain we have an individual, not a collective right to gun ownership in Kansas. '" 75 One opponent charged that the amendment was pointless: "'The U.S. Supreme Court, . . . in two different decisions over the last two years has determined that the 2nd Amendment is applicable to the states. . . . This is completely ridiculous and unnecessary. '" 76 Superficially, the observation that the Second Amendment already protects gun rights and thus makes state constitutional provisions redundant or unnecessary might seem persuasive, but Heller makes clear-if that is the right way to describe a decision that specifically fails to articulate a standard for evaluating Second Amendment claims-that the right the Court recognizes is far from powerful and expansive.
77 Indeed, the Heller opinion goes out of its way to reassure everyone that a host of federal statutes regulating firearms are constitutional. 78 Thus, it is not at all clear how much substance there is to Second Amendment rights, 79 and it may make considerable sense for a state constitutional guarantee to be clear and explicit, unlike Heller and the Second Amendment. Blaksley, 83 P. 619, 620 (Kan. 1905) . One case struck down a gun-control ordinance as "unconstitutionally overbroad" without ever mentioning section 4, instead seeming to rely on due process principles and apparently concluding that the city ordinance at issue was
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At the same time, however, the Supremacy Clause-in combination with the federal statutes explicitly mentioned and blessed in Hellermay result in states having limited power to guarantee or provide to their citizens gun rights broader than those the Supreme Court recognizes as Second Amendment rights. This is not because the Second Amendment itself restricts states from choosing to recognize more expansive gun rights. Under our system of dual sovereignty, federal Bill of Rights guarantees are floors of individual-rights guarantees, not ceilings, 81 so in the absence of any federal statutes in this area, states would be free to recognize significantly broader gun rights than the Second Amendment may be held to provide.
The rub, however, is all of those federal statutes that the Heller Court expressly approved-though with no explanation. 82 To get a sense of the federal statutes to which the Court was referring, the best source is the amicus curiae brief that the United States filed in Heller. Remember that although the District of Columbia is a unique federal enclave rather than a state, the United States was not a party to the case, which was between Mr. Heller and the District of Columbia local government. 83 Nonetheless, the United States filed an amicus brief in the case, and the Court permitted the Solicitor General of the United States to participate extensively in the Heller oral argument. In light of this fact, it seems quite likely that the Heller majority's references to federal statutes regulating firearms were made with the U.S. brief in mind.
The United States argued that the Second Amendment creates an individual right to keep and bear arms, but that the right is limited and subject to considerable regulation by Congress. 84 Indeed, the brief identified four categories of federal statutes regulating firearms, all of which the government argued were constitutional even if the Court recognized an individual right in the Second Amendment to keep and irrational. See City of Junction City v. Mevis, 601 P.2d 1145 , 1150 -51 (Kan. 1979 . In the most recent Kansas case raising a section 4 claim, the court concluded that a prohibition on concealed weapons did not violate the Second Amendment and further reaffirmed the Blaksley precedent that section 4 did not preclude concealed-carry regulations. See State v. Knight, 218 P.3d 1177 , 1188 -90 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009 ). In light of these cases, it is not at all clear that before its amendment in 2010, section 4 of the Kansas Bill of Rights recognized an individual right to keep and bear arms, nor would the scope of any such right have been at all certain under the pre-2010 version of that provision. Thus, amending section 4 was a logical and potentially important option for those Kansans who prefer a strong state constitutional right to keep and bear arms. (2) statutes prohibiting certain persons from possessing firearms, such as convicted felons, fugitives from justice, those with certain drug convictions, those found mentally incompetent, aliens illegally in the U.S., those dishonorably discharged from the armed forces, those who have renounced their U.S. citizenship, certain persons subject to restraining orders, and those convicted of certain crimes of domestic violence; 86 (3) statutes prohibiting firearms in certain locations, such as federal government facilities, the Capitol and its grounds, and aircraft; 87 and (4) statutes regulating commercial transactions involving firearms, including the manufacture, sale, and importation of firearms. 88 After reciting these numerous federal statutes, the brief noted that the Attorney General had "made clear that the United States 'can and will continue to defend vigorously the constitutionality, under the Second Amendment, of all existing federal firearms laws.'" 89 The brief later argued the constitutionality of categories (1), (2), and (4) at some length. constitutional provisions to the contrary. 91 Thus, felons prohibited by federal law from possessing firearms can find no comfort in state constitutional provisions, nor can those who might wish to bear arms in locations currently off-limits under federal law, such as airports, schools, courthouses, and perhaps other public buildings. I am not taking issue with any of these restrictions but, rather, simply pointing out that they limit the constitutional choices available to state supreme courts interpreting state constitutional provisions recognizing gun rights.
Thus, in the context of gun rights, the Second Amendment is not the end of the federal story; rather, it is just the beginning. So long as this "right" remains heavily and validly regulated by Congress and the federal government, states will have less power to interpret their state constitutional gun-rights provisions broadly. State supreme courts may interpret their state constitutions to provide greater protections for gun rights, but only if such expanded protections do not conflict with any requirements of federal statutes or regulations. Because of the Supremacy Clause, state constitutions cannot override federal laws restricting the possession, use, and sale of firearms.
92
Ultimately, the gun-rights situation is another fascinating illustration of dual sovereignty, an interesting and enlightening example of the interaction between federal and state law in the area of personal liberties. The Second Amendment will preclude all governments-federal, state, and local-from banning handgun possession or use in general and from compelling citizens to render ordinary and common weapons such as rifles and shotguns inoperable or ineffective in their own homes. But the Second Amendment right is far from absolute, and indeed the Supreme Court appears to have gone out of its way in Heller to bless the constitutionality of dozens of federal statutes regulating firearm possession, use, and transactions.
93
Even though the Supreme Court has in a real sense "federalized" the area of gun rights by giving some life and meaning to the Second Amendment, the Court at the same time has made clear that significant federal regulation of gun rights-regulation that is not speculative but already exists in the form of numerous federal statutes-does not violate the Second Amendment. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the full scope, nature, and legal bases for an individual's right to keep and bear arms will be determined only after considerable legal "dialogue" that will occur in the federal and state courts, in Congress, in the state legislatures, and in local government bodies.
96
That is a familiar result under the American system of dual sovereignty, and it is perhaps one of the reasons why we continue to resolve our differences over important topics such as gun rights through public debate, legislative and executive policy initiatives, and litigation in our courts rather than resorting to violence or other unlawful means. An ongoing public dialogue about important issues of individual rights is a necessary result of a system in which both the U.S. Constitution and the 95. The McDonald plurality expressly recognized that incorporation of Second Amendment rights against the states "will to some extent limit the legislative freedom of the States, but this is always true when a Bill of Rights provision is incorporated. Incorporation always restricts experimentation and local variations, but that has not stopped the Court from incorporating virtually every other provision of the Bill of Rights." McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (plurality opinion). Unlike with the Second Amendment, there are not dozens of federal statutes directly regulating the individual liberties guaranteed in most Bill of Rights provisions. Thus, the real restriction on the states in the Second Amendment context may not be incorporation of that provision against the states but rather the federal statutory and regulatory scheme that governs firearms and preempts any state constitutional provisions or interpretations that conflict with federal law.
96. In this regard, good lawyers will be those prepared to argue both federal and state constitutional law on behalf of their clients. See Jeffrey S. Sutton, Speech, Why Teach-and Why Study-State Constitutional Law, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 165, 178 (2009) ("What is important is that no lawyer worth his or her salt can be a good advocate in today's world without appreciating the possibility-and value-of raising state and federal claims in representing a client. . . . A lawyer cannot do that today without understanding state constitutional law and appreciating its significance in modern individual-rights disputes.").
state constitutions exist to protect the rights of citizens. That the dialogue may at times be wonderfully complex, or perhaps maddeningly so, and that it may last for years, decades, or perhaps never end, are inherent and probably salutary features of the uniquely American system of dual sovereignty. KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
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